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Contrary to what happened before NAFTA, wage inequality in Mexico 
decreased after 1994. This paper investigates the forces behind the post 
NAFTA decrease in wage inequality. Using a quantile decomposition, I 
show that the decline in wage inequality is driven by a decline in the 
returns to education and potential experience, especially at the top of the 
wage distribution. Supply and demand are the main contributors for this 
change. On the supply side, there were substantial increases in college 
enrollment rates after 1994, which translated into an increase in the 
proportion of workers with a college degree. However, this increase in 
supply was not met by an increase in demand for the highly educated: the 
proportion of the workforce in top qualified occupations and close to the 
top occupations did not increase as much as the increase in supply. As a 
result, college educated workers put wage pressures in top and less than 
top qualified occupations. A Bound and Johnson (1992) decomposition 
confirms that changes in relative supply are the main determinant behind 
the decrease in wage inequality. 
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Inequality, either measured by income or wages, is an important topic that has been con-
tinuously debated among academics and the media. Since the 1980s, most countries in the
world experienced an increase in wage inequality and for some countries this trend continued
during the 1990s. Mexico was no exception and went trough a period of increasing inequality
by the end of the 1980s. However, wage inequality in Mexico started to decline after 1994,
the period after NAFTA was enacted. This could be surprising given the relatively large
literature explaining the causes of the increase in inequality at the end of the 1980s and
beginning of the 1990s.1 Figure 1 documents the patterns of wage inequality in Mexico.
Even though the decline has been taking place since 1994-1996, there are few references for
this episode in the literature.2 In this paper I try to ￿ll this gap and I give an explanation
for the potential causes of this episode.
Wage inequality has continuously increased during the last 20 years in the United States
and other developed countries.3 There is a debate about the causes of this increase. On
one hand, David Autor, Lawrence Katz and Daron Acemoglu among others4 argue that skill
biased technical change is the leading explanation for the increase in wage inequality. Since
the supply of college educated increased during the period, the only possible explanation is
that demand increased by more than the supply and that the growth in demand is biased
towards skilled workers. On the other hand, Thomas Lemieux, David Card and John Dinardo
among others5 criticize the view of skill biased technical change as the main source for changes
in wage inequality. Instead, they argue that the increase in wage inequality at the end of
the 1980s and beginning of 1990s can be seen as episodic rather than driven by skill biased
technical change. According to their estimates, most of the increase in wage inequality,
especially at the bottom of the wage distribution, in that period can be explained by the fall
in the real minimum wage and a decline in unionization rates. More recently, Autor et al.
(2008) recognize changes in the real value of the minimum wage and the fall of unionization
rates as plausible explanations for changes in lower tail inequality. However, they point
1For example see the papers by Airola and Juhn (2005), Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Esquivel and
Rodr￿guez-L￿pez (2003), Fairris (2003), Feliciano (2001), Hanson (2003), Revenga (1997), L￿pez-Acevedo
(2006), Meza (2005), Robertson (2004).
2As explained below, I use the Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for the analysis. The peak of wage inequality
di⁄ers from the one calculated using the Labor Force Survey. Wage inequality in the Labor Survey peaks
in 1996, but the downward trend is very similar to the trend using the Expenditure Survey. Some recent
papers like Airola and Juhn (2005) and L￿pez-Acevedo (2006) acknowledge either that wage inequality has
not grown or has decreased slightly. The view in this paper is that wage inequality has decreased substantially
after 1994. Similar discussions can also be found in Chiquiar (2008), Esquivel (2009) and Robertson (2007).
3Katz and Autor (1999), Table 10.
4Acemoglu (2002), Autor et al. (2003), Autor et al. (2005, 2007, 2008).
5Card and DiNardo (2002), DiNardo et al. (1996), Lemieux (2006, 2008).
2out that institutional aspects cannot explain the continuous rise in upper tail inequality.
They conclude the increase in upper tail inequality cannot be explained by quantities but
by returns, justifying the view of skill biased technical change as an important source for
changes in wage inequality.
In some developed countries the wage structure has been changing favoring the high and
low skilled workers. This process increases upper tail wage inequality but reduces lower tail
inequality. For the U.S., Autor et al. (2007) show how high skilled jobs (occupations) in
1980 were the ones with the highest increase in demand, measured by the increase in the
proportion of workers in those occupations. They also ￿nd that occupations in the lower tail
increased their participation, but at the expense of middle-tier jobs. Furthermore, in the
U.K., Goos and Manning (2007) ￿nd a similar pattern to that in the U.S. case, and call this
U-shaped pattern "job polarization." They conclude that skill biased technical change and
job polarization are likely explanations for the increase in wage inequality. In another study
on Germany, Dustmann et al. (2007) and Spitz-Oener (2006) ￿nd that job polarization is
present and the increase in wage inequality can be explained in part by that process.
As explained above, inequality has continuously increased in developed countries since
the 1980s. In contrast, Mexico exhibits a decrease in inequality after 1994, and in this paper
I explore the causes of such a decline. This is important for at least three reasons. First,
societies generally value a more egalitarian distribution of resources. Hence the example
of Mexico may be useful to other similar countries that desire to attain lower inequality
levels. Second, it is also interesting to investigate whether Mexico has "job polarized" as
other countries and analyze how this process modi￿es the wage distribution. Finally, other
Latin American countries have seen a decline in wage inequality recently, hence the Mexican
experience could help in building a consensus on why wage inequality has fallen in the region.6
In order to analyze the sources of the fall in wage inequality, I follow Mata and Machado
(2005) decomposition. In particular, I estimate quantile regressions and build counterfactuals
of the wage distribution holding constant observable characteristics or returns in schooling
and potential labor experience. This decomposition is similar to DiNardo et al. (1996)
non-parametric decomposition. The goal is to estimate the level of inequality using the
endowments from one speci￿c year but assuming returns values for a di⁄erent year and
vice versa. The results of the decomposition show that the returns to education and labor
experience are the most important factor explaining the decrease in wage inequality. The
decline in returns is explained by a substantial increase in college graduates in the last 10
years, but it is also due to slower growth in labor demand, especially for the top paid jobs.
6For example, see the cases in Argentina (Gasparini et al. (2009)), Brazil (Ferreira et al. (2008)) and
Chile (Eberhard and Engel (2009)). A nice summary can be found in Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2009).
3I divide jobs by "quality" using the occupation median wage in 1992 and show that top
quality jobs did not grow as much as the increase in supply of high-skilled workers. Instead,
low wage jobs increased their participation substantially at the expense of above the median
wage jobs. In order to present further evidence on my ￿ndings, I decompose the relative
wage changes as in Bound and Johnson (1992). These results con￿rm that changes in
relative supply are the main determinant behind the decrease in wage inequality.
A few recent papers have discussed the issue on why inequality in Mexico has fallen since
NAFTA. Esquivel (2009) describes the patterns of total income inequality and concludes that
the fall in income inequality since NAFTA is mainly driven by earnings of workers. Esquivel
(2009) argues that the fall in inequality could be explained by a change in the composition of
workers and a late outcome of trade liberalization.7 Robertson (2004, 2007) argues that the
fall in wage inequality is driven by traditional trade channels. Moreover, workers in Mexico
since NAFTA appeared to be complements to U.S. workers, not substitutes. L￿pez-Acevedo
(2006) using data from 1996 to 2002 shows how a di⁄erent education composition structure
a⁄ects earnings inequality. The current paper di⁄erentiates from the previous papers in
distinct ways. First, the paper explores di⁄erent competing explanations of changes in wage
inequality. Second, it provides empirical evidence on the job polarization hypothesis, a
theory that has not been tested previously in Mexico. Finally, it formally decomposes the
e⁄ect of returns and endowments of the labor force on the wage structure in Mexico. These
decompositions achieve the goal of creating counterfactuals of what would have happened
to the wage distribution had the returns or endowments been constant through the period.
The previous papers do not attempt in constructing counterfactuals.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I describe the basic facts and
trends of wage inequality in Mexico for di⁄erent groups. Then I question and contrast
di⁄erent hypotheses of the decline of wage inequality in the last years. The next section
carries the Mata and Machado (2005) methodology to decompose wage inequality, I present
results for this decomposition and then analyze whether job polarization has occurred in
Mexico and relate this process to the change in wage inequality. I then calculate the percent
e⁄ect driven by supply and the percent e⁄ect driven by demand factors following the Bound
and Johnson (1992) decomposition. The last section o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
7It is important to mention that Esquivel (2009) uses the summary statistics and results in this paper to
draw some of his main conclusions.
42 Facts
There are three sources of data in Mexico that can be used to calculate wage inequality:
Expenditure Survey, Labor Survey and the Census. Census data is not used given that there
are only two points in time (1990 and 2000) and most of the decline in wage inequality is for
the period 1998-2006. The labor survey has two drawbacks: it is not nationally representative
given that it only has data for urban areas, and, more importantly, its methodology changed
after 2004 rendering it useless for my purposes. For those reasons, my analysis will be based
on the Expenditure survey (ENIGH, for its Spanish acronym). The ENIGH is nationally
representative and it includes relevant variables such as income sources, expenditures and
demographic characteristics. ENIGH surveys can be compared across years. ENIGH is
available for years 1989, 1992 and very two years since then plus year 2005. 8
In what follows I restrict the sample to all workers 18-65 year old with positive hours
of work and valid wage. When calculating hourly wage I follow Airola and Juhn (2005)
and calculate monthly wage over 4.33 times hours of work, and when calculating descriptive
statistics I use as a weight the person weight from the data times hours of work as is commonly
used in the wage inequality literature. Wages are in constant 2006 Mexican Pesos. I drop
observations with real hourly wage less than $1 MXP.9 I do not restrict the sample to full-
time workers, but in the Appendix I show some of the results presented below including just
full-time workers as well as using other de￿nitions of income.10
Figure 1 plots the trends of wage inequality in Mexico since 1989 using the log di⁄erence
between the 90th and 10th percentile. As has been documented in the literature, Mexico
experienced a large increase in wage inequality in the period before 1994. What has not
been documented as widely is the substantial decrease in wage inequality after 1994. This
decline in wage inequality applies to both males and females, although the decline is more
consistent for males. Wage inequality has decreased by more than 20 log points during this
8Wage income and the de￿nition of occupations are comparable throughout the period. These are two
key variables in my analysis. The Labor Survey (ENEU) can be compared for urban areas from 1989 until
2003-2004 depending on the number of cities included in the analysis. As wage inequality still decreased for
the period 2003-2006, I use the Expenditure survey to take into account this latter period. It is important to
clarify that the pattern of wage inequality in the Expenditure Survey is similar to the pattern in the Labor
Survey, the di⁄erence that the peak in wage inequality is in 1996 instead of 1994. Moreover, even though
ENIGH 2008 is available I decide not to use it given the e⁄ect of the macroeconomic crisis on employment
outcomes.
9I experimented with di⁄erent trimming regions and the trends of wage inequality were not a⁄ected. In
order to keep as many observations as possible, I only drop observations with real hourly wage less than $1
MXP because the log transformation a⁄ects these values substantially. This censoring is innocuous given
that less than 0.5% of the observations are a⁄ected across years on average.
10In the ENIGH, I de￿ne wage income consistently across surveys as "Wages" only coming from Labor
Income. This term represents most of total labor income and total income. I calculated results (not reported)
using total labor income and the results were similar to those obtained in the Appendix.
5period. Figure 2 and Figure 3 decompose wage inequality using the log di⁄erence between
the 90th and 50th and the 50th and 10th percentile respectively. Figure 2 shows a decline
in top wage inequality while Figure 3 shows a decline in bottom wage inequality but not as
strong as the decline in top wage inequality.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 exhibit a decline in wage inequality mainly driven by top wage
inequality. In the Appendix, Table A1 presents di⁄erent calculations of wage inequality
using the standard deviation of log wages and the Gini coe¢ cient as well as using di⁄erent
de￿nitions of income. As we can see in this table, inequality has gone down since 1994
independently how it is measured. For example, the Gini coe¢ cient has decreased 0.06 units
and when measured by the standard deviation of log wages it has decreased by 0.04 units.
These are substantial decreases considering the increase in wage inequality during 1989-1994.
For example the Gini coe¢ cient increased by 0.08 and the standard deviation measure by
0.09 units. The Gini coe¢ cient and the standard deviation measure show a decline in wage
inequality, but cannot distinguish the decline in wage inequality in the lower or upper part
of the wage distribution. For this reason, I focus mainly in the di⁄erence between percentiles
90th and 50th and 50th and 10th as measures of lower and upper tail inequality.
In order to analyze more carefully the change in wage inequality during 1994-2006, Figure
4 presents the change in the log wage by centiles of the wage distribution using years 1994
and 2006.11 For example, the ￿rst decile (up to quantile 10) experienced an increase in real
wages close to 5 percent between 1994 and 2006. This graph indicates that there was an
increase in the real wage for workers at the bottom half of the wage distribution. In fact,
percentiles in the top half experienced a decrease in real wages and this decline was even
larger for top percentiles (although again for women this is not the case). The real wage of
the top decile decreased on average 30 percent.
The Mexican Peso crisis at the end of 1994 cannot explain the full decline in wage
inequality during this period.12 For example, Figure 5 exhibits a similar plot to Figure 4 but
using years 1996 and 2006 instead of 1994 and 2006. Real wages at the top are still declining
in comparison to di⁄erent wages across the wage distribution, especially those at the very
top. Deciles 2-4 had the highest wage increases during the whole period.
Finally, Figure 6 plots the change in wage inequality for years 1989-2006. Wages for
the bottom half of the distribution (males and females) were more or less constant, with
substantial increases for the very poor. The real losers in this period were the "middle-class"
11Given the small sample size of ENIGH, the use of centiles causes missing wages for some centiles,
especially for women. For this reason, I aggregate the information every two centiles.
12Mexico experienced a deep contraction in economic activity in 1995. GDP fell by 7 percent in 1995 and
in￿ ation increased by 50 percent in 1995. As shown in ￿gures, nominal wages did not adjust completely to
the increase in in￿ ation resulting in lower real wages.
6and some high earners. Wages for workers between the 50th and 80th percentile decreased
by close to 5 percent on average. Wages for workers between the 80th and 90th percentile
decreased by close to 3 percent on average. The top decile increased their wages by close
to 6 percent on average. On the other hand, females substantially improved their wages
at the top of the distribution. The message in ￿gures (4)-(6) is that the evolution of wage
inequality in Mexico needs to be separated before and after NAFTA.
In sum, Figure 1 demonstrates that something a⁄ected the Mexican economy during the
period 1994-2006 causing a decline in wage inequality. Table 1 analyzes this issue more care-
fully and presents information on how real wages have evolved for di⁄erent groups of workers.
I follow Autor et al. (2008), and analyze subgroups of workers divided by gender, education
(less than Secondary, Secondary, High School and College), and potential experience (1-20
years of experience and more than 20 years of experience) for a total of 16 groups.13 Then I
calculate mean wages for each group and the proportion of workers in that group.
Table 1 shows the decline in real hourly wages after the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994.
However, in general there was a strong recovery for the period 1996-2000. After year 2000,
wages have been stagnant. This is also true for other measures of income as presented in the
Appendix. The wages of workers with less than a high school degree increased the most for
the period after NAFTA (1996-2006), especially for males. Looking at the education groups,
it is surprising that wages of workers with a high school degree and a college degree have
gone down after 2000 for both experience groups. At the same time, we can notice there
was an increase in the proportion of workers with high school and college degrees during
the period 1989-2006, especially for women. For example, the proportion of female college
workers with less than 20 years of experience increased 2 percentage points, and in high
school the increase is 3 percentage points.
Table 1 presents evidence that there is a striking di⁄erence in terms of the proportion of
workers with di⁄erent educational levels. Female workers with secondary education increased
their proportion in the workforce by 1 percentage point between 1989 and 1996, but their
proportion decreased between 1996 and 2006 for both experience groups. In contrast, male
and female workers with high school increased their participation close to 1 percentage point
respectively between 1989 and 1996, but in the period 1996-2006 their participation in the
workforce increased 3 percentage points respectively. A similar pattern can be depicted for
college workers. In sum, the main message in Table 1 refers to a di⁄erence in the proportion
of workers in di⁄erent education groups between the 1989-1996 and 1996-2006 periods.
13Less than secondary refers to less than 9 years of schooling, secondary refers to more or equal than 9
years of schooling but less than 12, high school refers to more or equal than12 years of schooling but less
than 16, and college refers to more than 16 years of schooling.
73 Hypothesis
Following the seminal work by Bound and Johnson (1992) and the literature reviewed in
Machin (2008), there are two distinctive forces that a⁄ect the wage structure. First, com-
petitive factors like the change in supply and demand of workers a⁄ect directly the wages of
workers. Second, non-competitive factors like changes in minimum wages and unionization
rates may explain changes in the wage structure. The main hypothesis in the current pa-
per is that changes in the wage structure in Mexico for the post-NAFTA period are driven
primarily by supply and demand forces.
There are many papers analyzing the role of unions and minimum wage on inequality in
Mexico for the period before 1996. Fairris (2003) and Fairris and Levine (2003) conclude
that the falling unionization rate between 1984 and 1996 explains 11 percent of the increase
in wage inequality.Kaplan and Novaro (2006) and Bosch and Manacorda (2008) analyze the
e⁄ect of the minimum wage on the wage structure and wage inequality during the 1989-1994
period and later periods. In particular, Kaplan and Novaro (2006) argue that although the
minimum wage is not binding in Mexico it a⁄ects other wages in the distribution. Bosch
and Manacorda (2008) argue that the increase in wage inequality for the period 1989-2000
can be explained by a falling real minimum wage, especially for years 1989-1996.
If institutional factors are fundamentally altered during the period post NAFTA, then
those changes could explain changes in the wage structure. However, unionization rates
and the real minimum wage have been constant throughout the period in Mexico and, as
a consequence, they are unable to explain the decline in wage inequality, even more so for
the decline in top wage inequality. Figure 7 depicts the trend of unionization rates and
real minimum wage for the period 1989-2006. Before 1994 there is a sharp decline in both
unionization rates and the minimum wage. Unionization rates fell almost 6 percentage points
during 1989-2006, and the minimum wage lost 30 percent of its real value. However, for the
period 1996-2006 both unionization rates and real minimum wage were fairly constant. The
real value of the minimum wage practically did not su⁄er any changes while unionization
rates fell by 2 percentage points, although this fall was mainly driven for the year 2006.
Since institutional factors were not signi￿cantly altered during the period 1996-2006, the
causes of the decline in wage inequality, especially at the top, need to be found elsewhere. It
is possible that a constant minimum wage helped to keep constant lower tail inequality, but
it is hard to argue that a constant minimum wage caused a decline in top wage inequality.
As for the competitive factors on the demand side, there have been raised two leading
(and confounding) forces driving wage inequality: trade and skill biased technical change.14
14There are many papers analyzing the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the wage structure for the period
8Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) and Esquivel and Rodr￿guez-L￿pez (2003) argue that most of
the increase in wage inequality before NAFTA is driven by skill biased technical change.
Given that trade liberalization in Mexico occurred in the mid 1980s, the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem would have predicted a decrease in wage inequality not an increase. In particular,
Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) concludes that the traded sector in the economy became more
skill-intensive suggesting a decline in demand for less skilled workers. Robertson (2004,
2007) analyzes the role of trade for the period after NAFTA. He mentions that trade caused
a reorientation in Mexican manufacturing bene￿ting less skilled workers.15
However, empirical applications face a serious challenge in separating the e⁄ects of trade,
skill biased technical change and other changes in demand when using samples for the full
population. For example, Esquivel (2009) ￿nds that wage inequality has decreased among all
industries (not only manufacturing) and regions.16 Hence, trade theories need to explain why
trade a⁄ects all industries in a similar way. Moreover, some studies restrict their analysis
to the manufacturing industry to identify the trade e⁄ect, but the proportion of workers in
manufacturing is low, around 20 percent, and not representative of all workers. Given these
criticisms, instead of separating each demand e⁄ect on wages, I calculate changes in total
demand as in Bound and Johnson (1992) and Goos and Manning (2007).
Following Bound and Johnson (1992) decomposition, I argue there are two main reasons
for the decline in wage inequality. The ￿rst reason is the substantial increase in schooling
after 1990, especially in the second half of the 1990s after the 1992 reform which imposed
mandatory schooling for secondary education. The second reason involves an absence of top
quality jobs creation or lack of growth in labor demand for skilled workers.
Figure 8 plots total school enrollment and Figure 9 shows enrollment rates adjusting for
population since 1980.17 Before 1994 there is no substantial increase in enrollment rates.
High School education increased slightly but this increase is mainly driven by the increase
before NAFTA. See for example the references cited in the Introduction of the paper. A nice review can
be found in Esquivel (2009). This section does not attempt to summarize all the evidence of trade on wage
inequality before NAFTA.
15This is consistent with the ￿ndings in Chiquiar (2008). However, Chiquiar (2008) only uses data up to
year 2000 and cannot explore wage disparities across regions or industries for more recent years.
16See for example Figures 11 and 12 in Esquivel (2009).
17Enrollment data is available online through Secretaria de Educacion Publica web-
site http://www.sep.gob.mx. Population data is obtained through the Statistical O¢ ce
http://www.inegi.com.mx using Census data. I adjust for population in the following way. There
are di⁄erent age groups in the Census as reported by the Statitiscal O¢ ce: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24.
I use this age structure to calculate population growth rates by age and population stocks. There is no
information for Census year 1980 so I assume the same population in 1980 depending on the age structure
of 1970. In particular I assume zero mortality rate for this period for each age group. The age group
for Secondary is 10-14, High School 15-19 and College 20-24. To calculate population growth rates I just
assume a linear growth rate between two Census years. I use also the Conteo de Poblacion (similar to the
Census) for years 1995 and 2005 to get more accurate population estimates.
9during 1980-1985, and after 1985 enrollment did not increase. College enrollment was fairly
constant during the period 1980-1994. Supply of skilled workers did not change for the
period before 1994. As enrollment rates for college and high school increased substantially
after 1994, and as college usually requires 4 years of education, we expect college enrollment
to have an e⁄ect on wages for year 2000 and afterwards.
Figure 10 plots the relative wage and relative supply of male workers with Secondary
education and College education in logs levels. The ￿rst y-axis includes the log of the
ratio of wage between secondary and college educated workers. The second y-axis includes
the proportion of workers in the same education categories. Both wages and proportion of
workers are obtained from the estimates provided in Table 1. The trend in the proportion
of workers has been smoothed using a simple moving average, I multiply the previous and
post period by 0.25 respectively and add the current period times 0.50. Before 1994, the
trends cannot be related with each other. After 1996 and especially after year 2000 inclusive,
the trends between wages and proportion of workers are negatively correlated. The timing
of the decline in relative wages coincides with the expansion of enrollment rates for college
education shown in Figures 8 and 9 (adding the 4 years of college education).
Assuming that other factors like demand and skill biased technical change are negligible,
Figure 10 implies that the elasticity of substitution between secondary and college workers is
slightly above unity.18 This elasticity implies that, holding constant other factors, a decrease
in the proportion of workers with secondary education relative to college education by one
percent raises the relative wage by slightly less than one percent. Section 5 below analyzes
changes in relative supply and their e⁄ect on changes in relative wages for di⁄erent elasticities
of substitution.
Although the change in educational levels is an important factor to explain the decrease
in wage inequality, it cannot be the only explanation. If college education increases and the
returns to college are unchanged, then inequality has to increase given the small proportion
of workers with college education. Hence, returns to college education are lower now than
they were in 1994. A decrease in demand for college educated workers explains also part
of the decline in the returns to college. Even though the decline in wage inequality can be
seen as something positive for society, the decline is not an entirely good thing given that
recent college graduates have not been able to ￿nd high quality jobs. In particular, college
18Assuming a simple Constant Elasticity Substitution production function with only two inputs Secondary
and College workers Y = [S￿ + C￿]1=￿ and the elasticity of substitution is de￿ned as ￿ = 1
1￿￿, using the











: Hence, the elasticity of substitution can be calculated
as the change in relative wages over the change in relative proportions assuming everything else is constant,
assuming other factors like demand and skill biased technical change were not altered. In Section 5 I augment
this formula to account for changes in demand as well.
10educated workers have been downgraded in occupational terms and are putting pressure to
lower occupational skills. Labor demand and job creation have not been able to absorb all




In this subsection, I analyze the e⁄ects of the increase of educational levels on wage in-
equality using the Mata and Machado (2005) decomposition. This decomposition analyzes
whether changes in wage inequality are driven mainly by quantities (endowments) or by
prices (returns) as in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition or in the non-parametric decompo-
sition suggested by DiNardo et al. (1996). The only di⁄erence here is that instead of using
the means only, the decomposition uses quantiles of the full wage distribution. The con-
ditions for this procedure to work are that the characterization of the quantile regressions
needs to be correctly speci￿ed, that quantile regression estimates are accurate predictors
of the true wage distribution and ￿nally the assumption of partial equilibrium. The last
assumption means that if returns are increasing, individuals do not increase their levels of
schooling because of the increase in returns.
The implementation is straightforward. First, I estimate quantile regressions separately
for each year and gender, I estimate regressions for quantiles ￿ = 0:01;0:02;:::;0:99. I follow
Autor et al. (2005) and estimate a ￿ exible functional form based on education and potential
experience.19 Second, I keep the coe¢ cients for each quantile and year. Third, I calculate
counterfactuals based on the endowment distribution for one year using the returns for a
di⁄erent year. For example, to calculate the change in inequality in quantile ￿ caused by the
e⁄ect of quantities between year t and ￿ using the returns as in year ￿, we calculate:
Q￿(X￿￿￿) ￿ Q￿(Xt￿￿)
where Q￿() is the result of multiplying the vector of parameters to each observation in the
data and ￿ represents the quantile of the resulting distribution.20 Notice that the decompo-
19Each regression includes dummy variables for the four educational groups described above (except work-
ers with less than secondary) each interacted with a cubic in potential experience. Each regression also
includes a Rural locality dummy variable. I restrict the counterfactual calculations to urban households,
i.e. setting the dummy variable of rural equal to zero. In sum, I run the following regression for each quan-











i +￿Rurali where Ed
are three education dummy variables (secondary, high school and college) and Exp potential experience.
20Mata and Machado (2005) use bootstrap samples to calculate counterfactuals. I follow Autor et al.
11sition assumes returns as in year ￿, but it is possible to ￿x the returns as in year t. Hence,
Q￿(X￿￿￿) ￿ Q￿(Xt￿￿) is the change in wage inequality explained by the change in endow-
ments assuming prices are as in year ￿. Like the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the total
observed change in inequality can be decomposed as
(Q￿(X￿￿￿) ￿ Q￿(Xt￿￿)) + (Q￿(Xt￿￿) ￿ Q￿(Xt￿t)) + "
where the ￿rst term is the estimated e⁄ect of quantities or endowments, the second term
is the e⁄ect of prices or returns and the last term is the residual. Obviously the e⁄ects
of quantities and prices are determined by what factor is taken into account ￿rst. In the
calculations below I change the order of the decomposition to check the robustness of the
results. Also, we expect the residual to be close to zero, that is we expect the quantile
estimation to be very close to the actual distribution otherwise it is possible that decomposing
wage inequality with quantiles is not valid.21
Table 2 shows the main results of this decomposition. The table includes the quantile
decomposition for three di⁄erent periods: 1996-2006, 1994-2006 and 1989-2006. Each period
includes the observed change in wage inequality, the e⁄ect due to quantities and prices, and
the residual. The ￿rst row for each group does the decomposition using quantities ￿rst and
then prices. The second row for each group (in italics) does the decomposition in the reverse
order: prices ￿rst and then quantities. For the male wage di⁄erential 90-10 and period
1996-2006, the observed change in wage inequality was -0.10. Had returns been constant,
wage inequality would have increased 0.17-0.23. On the other hand, had endowments been
constant wage inequality would have fallen close to 0.3.
The change in wage inequality in the top half of the wage distribution can be mostly
explained by a change of returns for periods 1994-2006 and 1996-2006. The order of the
decomposition does not matter suggesting that prices are an important determinant of the
fall in wage inequality. Given the 1994 economic crisis, the decomposition works better for
period 1996-2006 than for period 1994-2006. The residual is larger for the latter case. On
the other hand, the decomposition for the period 1989-2006 works poorly as the sign of
the estimates changes according to the order of the decomposition. This suggests that the
economic crisis is an important factor and that there are non-competitive factors a⁄ecting
the wage distribution. Factors like unionization, real minimum wages, industry rents are
(2005) instead, and multiply the full vector of parameters to each observation in the data. In this way, if
for example year 2000 includes 1,000 observations and we have 100 quantiles, the new dataset will contain







21In other words, when decomposing wage inequality with returns before than quantities we have the
following decomposition (Q￿(X￿￿￿) ￿ Q￿(X￿￿t)) + (Q￿(X￿￿t) ￿ Q￿(Xt￿t)) + "
12important factors that a⁄ected the wage distribution during the period 1989-1994.22 Bosch
and Manacorda (2008) argue that most part of the increase in wage inequality between 1989
and 2001, especially at the bottom of the distribution, can be explained by a declining real
minimum wage. This is consistent with the quantile decomposition given the large residuals
found for the period 1989-1994 and the inability to predict correctly the change in inequality
at the bottom of the distribution.
Results in the table show that the decrease in wage inequality is mainly driven by a fall in
the returns to schooling. Given the low levels of schooling in Mexico, if returns to education
had been constant then an increase in schooling would have increased wage inequality not
decreased. This is true for males and females except the case of top wage inequality for
females. For the period 1996-2006, it does not matter the order of the decomposition, the
results are closely similar. The decomposition works better for the wage di⁄erential 90-
10 and 90-50 than for the 50-10. Inequality at the bottom almost did not change so the
decomposition does not do a very good job. The e⁄ect of prices is concentrated in the top-
half of the distribution. This is consistent with Figure 10 showing relative wages between
secondary and college workers.
4.2 Job Polarization and Demand of High Quality Jobs
The second reason why inequality has fallen is the lack of job creation of high quality jobs. In
the last 20 years, developed countries have experienced a process known as "job polarization."
Studies for the U.S., England and Germany provide evidence that the increase in wage
inequality in these countries is driven by an increase in top wage inequality.23 In particular,
these studies ￿nd that labor demand for top quali￿ed occupations (ranked by wage paid in
a previous year) has increased. At the same time, as low quali￿ed occupations are likely
complements to top quali￿ed occupations, demand for low paid occupations has increased
and demand for middle paid occupations has decreased. This process leads to a decrease in
bottom wage inequality but an increase in top wage inequality.
If demand in Mexico for top quali￿ed jobs is growing, we expect the supply of college
workers to be absorbed by those jobs. If the labor demand growth rate is constant or
increasing for the period 1996-2006, the proportion of workers in top quali￿ed occupations
should increase. Following Goos and Manning (2007), a simple way to show this is creating
a graph in which the x-axis re￿ ects the rankings of the occupations (measured by the median
wage) and the y-axis re￿ ects the change in the proportion of workers in those occupations
22Examples for the U.S. are Bound and Johnson (1992), DiNardo et al. (1996), and for Mexico Fairris
(2003) and Bosch and Manacorda (2008)
23Autor et al. (2007), Goos and Manning (2007) and Dustmann et al. (2007).
13during the speci￿ed period.
I rank occupations based on the median wage of 1992 and then collapse them according
to deciles.24 Then I calculate the proportion of workers (hours adjusted) in each decile and
the change in the proportion of workers for di⁄erent periods. Figure 11 presents the plot
for periods 1994-2006, 1996-2006 and 2000-2006. Demand for the lowest paid occupation
(agricultural workers) fell the most during this period. However, low paid occupations in
deciles 2-4 increased their participation in the workforce and at the same time high paid
occupations did not increase their participation as much.
The increase in the proportion of workers for the top quali￿ed jobs was less than 1
percentage point between 1996-2006 or 2000-2006. Moreover, the period 2000-2006 shows
a clear process of slower demand for top quali￿ed jobs. The largest decline in this period is
not in agriculture but in close to top quali￿ed occupations, like secretaries, some workers in
manufacturing and some technicians in social sciences and medicine. As shown above, the
period 1998-2006 experienced large increases in high school and college education but these
workers were not absorbed by the top quali￿ed jobs.
Among the highest increase in demand for low paid occupations are the following: in
decile 2, construction workers and domestic service workers; decile 3, food, drinks and to-
bacco manufacturing workers and waiters; decile 4, employees in retail trade and textile
workers. For the top two deciles the main occupations that experienced demand growth are
professionals in the social sciences, however many professional occupations did not experi-
ence an increase in demand. Tables 3 and 4 analyze the occupations in the bottom and top
half of the wage distribution of 1992 and include the mean wage for some occupations as
well as the proportion of workers in that occupation for di⁄erent years. The largest increase
in employment was given by employees in retail trade.
Autor et al. (2003) argue that computers are the causal mechanism of job polarization.
As prices of computers decline, demand for occupations that are complements to computers
increase causing an increase in the wage paid to those occupations. However, at the same
time the demand for other occupations that are substitutes to computers declines. Since
computers substitute for occupations that are in the middle of the distribution, the decrease
in the demand for middle-tier jobs causes an increase in wage inequality at the top of the
distribution. In Mexico, some job polarization process is observed. Demand for occupations
that are close substitutes to computers declined: secretaries, some workers in manufacturing,
technicians. However, demand for occupations that are complements to computers did not
24I use year 1992 because it is the ￿rst year with the same coding in occupations as future years. Year
1989 uses a di⁄erent occupational code. For example, if the poorest occupation (agriculture) represents 10
percent of the population in 1992, then this occupation is the only one in the ￿rst decile. Then I calculate
the change in the proportion of workers between di⁄erent periods according to this ranking.
14increase. In the last row of table (4) I include the mean wage for all professional workers and
business managers and directors as well as the proportion of workers in those occupations. It
is striking that the proportion of workers in these occupations did not increase substantially.
Between 1996-2006 the proportion of workers increased by 0.72 percentage points.
As the share of workers with college education increased 5 percentage points in 1996-
2006 (Table 1), we would expect similar increases in professional occupations. But the main
professional occupations (social sciences, economics, accounting and engineering) increased
their participation in less than one percentage point as Table 4 suggests. College educated
workers needed to downgrade to work for lower paid occupations. Figure 12 shows a similar
graph to Figure 11. The only di⁄erence between these graphs is that Figure 12 calculates
the change in the share with college within each decile. In this way, decile 10 increased
less than 5 percentage points its participation of college educated workers between 2000
and 2006. This graph shows that deciles 8-10 had the largest increases in college educated
workers. Since the demand in top decile occupations could not absorb the supply of college
graduates, college workers had to downgrade to lower paid occupations, especially for the
period 2000-2006.
The results shown in this section depict a story where demand has not been growing
enough to keep up with the substantial increase in supply, especially for the college-educated.
Job polarization seems to be present in the bottom half of the occupations but there is no
substantial increase in demand in the top paid occupations. The excess supply in college
workers creates wage pressures not only in top quality jobs but also in less than top quality
jobs. As the enrollment rates for college individuals continue to increase this process will
likely put more pressure on wages at the top of the distribution.
5 Bound and Johnson (1992) Decomposition
In order to determine the e⁄ect of supply and demand on relative wages, I follow Bound and
Johnson (1992) decomposition and apply it to the case of Mexico for the period 1996-2006. I
further assume that non-competitive sources are not important during this period and then
determine the relative importance of supply and demand factors. Assuming a simple CES
production function with elasticity of substitution ￿ constant across skills, it is possible to
determine the e⁄ect of supply and demand on relative wages. In particular, it is possible to
show that the relative wage of college workers in terms of secondary workers can be expressed













15The residual term ￿ contains the e⁄ect of Skill Biased Technical Change and other non-
competitive factors. As unionization rates and the real minimum wage were fairly constant
during 1996-2006, I assume non-competitive factors are negligible. The supply component is
easily calculated from Table 1 and refers to the relative increase of college educated workers
over secondary educated workers.25 I follow Bound and Johnson (1992) to calculate the




(￿ln￿j) ￿ ￿ij (1)
where ￿j is the proportion of workers in industry j and ￿ij is the proportion of workers of
group i in industry j.26 In order to calculate the percent change of demand for college edu-
cated workers over secondary educated workers, I take the di⁄erence between the predicted
increase in demand for college workers and secondary educated workers, DemandCollege ￿
DemandSecondary.
Table 5 includes the calculations for the explanations of relative wage changes between
college educated workers and secondary educated workers. Figure 10 and Table 1 show that
men￿ s relative wages between college and secondary educated workers declined 20 log points
between 1996 and 2006. Relative supply, on the other hand, increased 27 log points during
the same period. If the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be equal to 2, then relative
supply changes explained 100 percent of decline in wages for all workers and 63 percent of
the decline in wages for males. Demand components calculated from formula (1) are small
in magnitude but negative, suggesting that relative demand between college and secondary
educated workers actually declined. This result is consistent with the previous section and
Figure 11. After NAFTA, labor demand did not increase for high skilled workers. The
residuals for the full sample and men in Table 5 are relatively small. The small residual
suggests that skill biased technical change was not important during this period.
Autor et al. (2003) argue that the causal mechanism for skill biased technical change
is the price of computers. As the price of computers declines, demand for jobs that are
complements to computers increases. Previous research on wage inequality in Mexico before
NAFTA has argued that skill biased technical change is one of the main reasons why wage






between the two periods of reference.
26I use 14 aggregated codes for industry from the Consumption Expenditure Survey. The appendix
includes a table with employment across these industries over time. The industries are: Agriculture, Mining,
Manufactures, Construction, Retail Trade, Transportation, Hotels and Restaurants, Finance and Professional
Services, Government , Health and Medical Services, Education, Domestic services, and Other services.
27See for example Esquivel and Rodr￿guez-L￿pez (2003), L￿pez-Acevedo (2006) and Meza (2005).
16change is relatively unimportant given the small residual after NAFTA. If there has been
no changes in the e⁄ect of skill biased technical change, then the fact that computer prices
have been decreasing during the last 20 years implies that skill biased technical change may
have a smaller role before NAFTA than previously thought.
6 Conclusions
As opposed to many developed countries, wage inequality in Mexico has been falling for the
period after 1994. Although the macroeconomic crisis is partially responsible for the decrease
in wage inequality immediately after 1994, the main reasons why inequality has fallen are
primarily driven by supply and demand forces. Institutional factors like unionization rates
and the real value of the minimum wage did not adjust signi￿cantly during this period and
hence they cannot explain the substantial decrease in wage inequality at the top of the wage
distribution. Enrollment rates in Mexico were fairly constant for the period 1980-1994. Only
after 1994 did Mexico substantially increase its enrollment rates of college and high school.
This increase in educational quali￿cations caused a substantial decrease in wage inequality
after 1998 through a decrease in returns to education. The second reason of the fall in
inequality is given by slower demand growth. In particular, the increase in supply of college
workers was not matched by an increase in top quali￿ed jobs.
Job polarization in Mexico is di⁄erent to the one experienced in other countries. Al-
though the proportion of workers in "lousy jobs", as de￿ned by Goos and Manning (2007),
is increasing, the "lovely jobs" do not show a corresponding increase in the proportion of
workers. The slow growth in top paid occupations is surprising considering the increase in
demand for top paid occupations in the U.S. and the U.K. More research is needed not only
to know how computers increase labor demand for top paid occupations, but more impor-
tantly for developing economies is to check whether there are ￿xed costs in the adoption
of new technologies or what institutional factors are impeding an increase in labor demand
through the use of computers.
The Bound and Johnson (1992) decomposition suggests that increases in the supply of
college educated workers are the main source for the decrease in wage inequality, but also
suggest that an absence in job creation and labor demand shifts are also responsible for the
lower wage inequality that Mexico experienced after NAFTA. These two mechanisms imply
that skill biased technical change did not play a substantial role for the modi￿cation of the
wage distribution. Moreover, if the price of computers decreased more in the period after
NAFTA than before its enactment, and computers are the causal mechanism for skill biased
technical change, the results in this paper cast caution on the explanation that skill biased
17technical change was the reason why wage inequality increased before NAFTA. Moreover,
results in this paper are consistent with other ￿ndings in Latin America as reviewed in
Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2009). The increase in the relative supply of skilled workers has
altered the relative returns of those workers. Moreover, changes in demand have not o⁄set
the increase in the supply of skilled workers.
Lower wage inequality can be a desirable goal for any society. However, Mexico has
experienced lower wage inequality partially for not being able to create enough top quality
jobs. As the supply of college workers increased, demand did not increase as much. This
process caused wage pressures for top quality jobs and for less than top quality jobs resulting
in lower wage inequality.
The experience of Mexico can be interesting for other developing countries. On one
side, it is possible to decrease wage inequality with substantial increases in educational
levels. However, if these increases are not accompanied with labor market reforms or an
environment that facilitates job creation, the newly quali￿ed workforce will not be used at
its maximum return.28
Policymakers in Mexico need to focus in mechanisms that create an environment to boost
job creation. As the supply of college educated workers continues to increase, wage pressures
will remain in the next years. Future research should try to measure and follow labor demand
for quali￿ed workers in the next years using the same survey as used here or di⁄erent ones.
We also need to understand what institutional factors are impeding an expansion of top
quality jobs in Mexico.
28Although an environment that creates more jobs than the increase in supply will likely increase inequality,
society may be better o⁄ in the latter case.
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Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped.
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Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
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Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped. The graph shows the di⁄erence between percentiles between the speci￿ed years.
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2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
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are dropped. The graph shows the di⁄erence between percentiles between the speci￿ed years.




























Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped. The graph shows the di⁄erence between percentiles between the speci￿ed years.
































































1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Union (1) Min Wage (2)
Note: Unionization rates based on all workers from Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) according to the sample
restrictions descibed in text: Workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real Minimum Wage using data
from Banco de Mexico.









































Note: Data available from Secretaria de Educacion Publica http://www.sep.gob.mx





































Note: Enrollment from Secretaria de Educacion Publica. Enrollment rates are equal to total enrollment
over population. Secondary Enrollment rates de￿ned over population age 10-14, High School Enrollment
rates de￿ned over population age 15-19, and College enrollment rates over population age 20-24.
Population by age group obtained from the Statistical O¢ ce INEGI http://www.inegi.com.mx. Population
stocks available only for years 1970, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005. I assume constant population growth
according to population stocks for the years described. In this way I obtain population stocks for every
year between Census year, then I divide actual enrollment over the predicted age-group population.























































































1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Rel Wages (1) Rel Supply (2)
Note: Data obtained from Table 1. The line of proportion of workers has been smoothed using a simple
moving average with weights equal to 0.25 for the previous and post period and 0.50 for the current period.
Hourly wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real
wage is calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one
MXP are dropped. Sample restricted to men.



















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1996-2006 1994-2006
2000-2006
Note: The x-axis represents deciles of workers according to the median wage by occupations in 1992. THe
y-axis is the change in the proportion of workers in those occupations between speci￿ed periods. Hourly
wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped.





















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1996-2006 1994-2006
2000-2006
Note: The x-axis represents deciles of workers according to the median wage by occupations in 1992. The
y-axis is the change in the proportion of workers with college degree between speci￿ed periods. Hourly
wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped.
34Table 1: Mean Log Wage of Workers by Gender, Education and Experience: 1989-2006.
Group 1989 1994 1996 2000 2006
A. Males
Education Experience
<Secondary <20 2.496 2.446 2.104 2.342 2.424
% Male Workers 0.177 0.174 0.139 0.119 0.090
<Secondary >20 2.603 2.582 2.273 2.455 2.497
% Male Workers 0.267 0.235 0.211 0.201 0.161
Secondary <20 2.777 2.766 2.442 2.595 2.660
% Male Workers 0.125 0.141 0.158 0.157 0.141
Secondary >20 3.208 3.219 2.836 2.985 2.907
% Male Workers 0.037 0.034 0.043 0.056 0.074
High School <20 3.275 3.283 2.943 2.935 2.873
% Male Workers 0.076 0.067 0.083 0.072 0.084
High School >20 3.617 4.050 3.461 3.336 3.239
% Male Workers 0.014 0.020 0.018 0.025 0.038
College <20 3.783 4.230 3.735 3.865 3.729
% Male Workers 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.049 0.052
College >20 4.108 4.604 4.071 4.208 4.000
% Male Workers 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.027 0.031
B. Females
<Secondary <20 2.330 2.293 1.977 2.223 2.236
% Female Workers 0.048 0.044 0.046 0.035 0.031
<Secondary >20 2.499 2.422 2.167 2.284 2.352
% Female Workers 0.063 0.053 0.061 0.058 0.058
Secondary <20 2.815 2.737 2.376 2.562 2.526
% Female Workers 0.065 0.079 0.079 0.074 0.062
Secondary >20 3.208 3.437 2.810 2.973 2.722
% Female Workers 0.013 0.019 0.023 0.037 0.034
High School <20 3.167 3.368 2.951 2.945 2.864
% Female Workers 0.035 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.062
High School >20 3.540 3.972 3.328 3.443 3.321
% Female Workers 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.027
College <20 3.654 3.975 3.512 3.644 3.527
% Female Workers 0.016 0.024 0.026 0.029 0.042
College >20 3.709 4.319 4.001 3.891 3.866
% Female Workers 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.013
Sample Size 10981 11612 12796 9107 20637
Note: There are 16 Groups by gender, education (4) and experience (2). I calculate weighted mean log
wages using as weights the sampling weights times usual hours of work. Hourly wage in 2006 Mexican
Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is calculated as monthly
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 3: Proportion and wage of workers in occupations in the bottom half of the wage
distribution. Di⁄erent years
Occupation De￿nition 1994 1996 2000 2006
Agricultural Share 9.11% 8.37% 6.47% 5.56%
Wage 8.08 6.21 7.56 7.70
Construction Share 5.02% 4.51% 5.17% 6.00%
Wage 12.12 7.73 10.79 12.99
Domestic Services Share 3.84% 4.56% 3.58% 4.31%
Wage 11.54 7.82 8.81 11.55
Food, Drinks and Tobbacco Share 1.64% 1.84% 1.79% 2.76%
Wage 12.55 9.32 11.04 12.93
Waiters Share 2.04% 2.12% 1.55% 2.06%
Wage 10.91 7.82 9.17 10.78
Employees in Retail trade Share 5.86% 5.74% 5.93% 7.13%
Wage 12.31 8.69 9.59 12.32
Cleaning, gardeners, etc Share 3.73% 3.98% 3.08% 4.46%
Wage 14.55 10.04 12.09 13.47
Note: Share represents the proportion of workers in that occupation, Wage represents the mean wage in
that occupation for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers
18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of
work. Workers with wages less than one MXP are dropped.
37Table 4: Proportion and wage of workers in occupations in the top half of the wage
distribution. Di⁄erent years.
Occupation De￿nition 1994 1996 2000 2006
Construction (Installers) Share 3.87% 3.04% 3.51% 3.23%
Wage 16.97 11.18 15.11 18.48
Machine Operators Share 1.68% 2.38% 2.92% 2.43%
Wage 15.79 12.48 15.11 15.40
Car and Truck Drivers Share 5.07% 4.84% 4.41% 5.35%
Wage 17.90 12.31 14.10 16.36
Cashiers Share 1.24% 1.55% 2.05% 1.63%
Wage 16.16 11.95 13.98 16.41
Manufacturing (Car, Machines, Instruments) Share 3.98% 3.67% 4.36% 2.94%
Wage 19.39 13.04 17.63 20.53
Secretaries Share 3.71% 4.09% 3.61% 2.37%
Wage 24.24 17.74 19.34 21.97
Technicians (Engineering) Share 1.43% 1.67% 2.04% 1.51%
Wage 29.09 21.43 25.18 23.09
Technicians (Medicine) Share 1.05% 0.85% 0.92% 0.95%
Wage 26.67 20.87 26.95 29.59
Technicians (Social Sciences) Share 2.25% 1.66% 1.70% 1.58%
Wage 31.03 19.56 22.67 26.94
Social Sciences Share 0.29% 0.42% 0.50% 0.53%
Wage 49.50 34.15 37.78 38.49
Economists, Business Management. Share 0.53% 0.65% 0.91% 1.03%
Wage 61.33 33.30 37.78 34.64
Primary Teachers Share 1.56% 1.46% 1.33% 1.42%
Wage 66.22 48.38 48.35 50.67
All Professions and Managers* Share 5.56% 5.72% 5.57% 6.44%
Wage 59.60 53.47 42.88 44.05
Note: Share represents the proportion of workers in that occupation, Wage represents the mean wage in
that occupation for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. * refers to all professions and
business and government managers and directors. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid
wage. Real wage is calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages
less than one MXP are dropped.
38Table 5: Predicted E⁄ects of Supply and Demand on Relative Wages
1996-2006
Obs Supply Demand Resid
A. ￿=2
ALL -0.200 -0.195 -0.029 0.024
MALES -0.218 -0.136 -0.038 -0.044
FEMALES -0.120 -0.303 -0.012 0.194
B. ￿=3
ALL -0.200 -0.130 -0.020 -0.051
MALES -0.218 -0.090 -0.026 -0.102
FEMALES -0.120 -0.202 -0.008 0.089
Note: Observed change in the relative wage and changes in relative supply calculated from Table (1).
Demand component calculated according to formula described in the text. Sigma refers to the elasticity of
substitution between factors.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table A2: Employment across industries
Industries 1989 1994 1996 2000 2006
Agriculture 15.6 12.7 11.7 10.3 8.1
Mining, Utilities 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.4
Construction 9.2 9.6 8.1 9.4 10.8
Manufactures 19.7 20.2 21.8 22.9 19.5
Trade 12.5 12.4 11.8 12.6 13.7
Restaurants, Hotels 3.8 4.0 4.6 3.7 5.8
Transportation 5.0 4.9 4.7 5.2 6.9
Government 5.9 6.1 6.7 7.2 6.7
Finance/Professional Services 4.5 5.0 5.3 4.8 4.1
Education 7.8 9.2 8.9 8.1 7.7
Medical and Social Services 4.5 4.7 4.5 3.9 4.0
Domestic Services 3.6 4.7 5.1 4.1 5.6
Other Services 5.0 4.9 5.0 6.4 5.7
Note: Numbers represent proportion of employed workers in speci￿c industry over total employment in the
year. Sample weights are used in the calculation.





























Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped. The graph shows the di⁄erence between percentiles between the speci￿ed years. Sample
restricted to fulltime workers.


































Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped. The graph shows the di⁄erence between percentiles between the speci￿ed years. Sample
restricted to fulltime workers.
































Note: Calculations by the author using Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for di⁄erent years. Hourly wage in
2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped. The graph shows the di⁄erence between percentiles between the speci￿ed years. Sample
restricted to fulltime workers.
46Figure A4: Relative Wage and Relative Supply of Workers with Secondary and College:



















































































1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Rel Wages (1) Rel Supply (2)
Note: Data obtained from Table 1. Hourly wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers
18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of
work. Workers with wages less than one MXP are dropped.
47Figure A5: Relative Wage and Relative Supply of Workers with Secondary and College:
















































































1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Rel Wages (1) Rel Supply (2)
Note: Data obtained from Table 1. The line of proportion of workers has been smoothed using a simple
moving average with weights equal to 0.25 for the previous and post period and 0.50 for the current period.
Hourly wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real
wage is calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one
MXP are dropped.
















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1996-2006 1994-2006
2000-2006
Note: The x-axis represents deciles of workers according to the median wage by occupations in 1992. THe
y-axis is the change in the proportion of workers in those occupations between speci￿ed periods. Hourly
wage in 2006 Mexican Pesos. Sample restricted to workers 18-65 years old with a valid wage. Real wage is
calculated as monthly wage over 4.33 times usual hours of work. Workers with wages less than one MXP
are dropped. Sample restricted to fulltime workers
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